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Abstract
The paper aims at evaluating the additionality of innovation pol-
icy in terms of innovative behaviours at the regional level.Innovation
behaviours are distinguished, depending on their occurrence within
and across the firms and the regional boundaries.The policy role with
respect to them is evaluated for a sample of firms in the Italian region
of Emilia-Romagna, by making use of an original, survey-based dataset,
to which a Propensity Score Matching approach is applied. Funded
firms are more likely to upgrade their competencies, when compared to
similar non subsidised companies. On the other hand, their innovation
cooperation with other business partners is not significantly affected by
the policy, both within and outside the region, unless in the interaction
with particular partners. All in all, the investigated innovation policy in
the ER region seems to show more of what could be termed ‘cognitive
capacity additionality’, rather than ‘network additionality’.
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1 Introduction
Innovation is a complex process, which involves systems of actors and inter-
actions, within and across different industries and territories (Edquist, 2005).
At the local level, this has inspired the notion of Regional System of Innova-
tion (RIS) (e.g. Cooke et al., 1997), which has revealed extremely helpful
in drawing policy implications to spur regional growth and competitiveness
(e.g. Howells, 1999; Asheim, 2009).
Using a system perspective, the spectrum of policy interventions extends
beyond the remedies to standard market failures in innovation, such as those
created by the public good nature of the underlying knowledge and by its
imperfect appropriability (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). A different kind of
failures require policies to address cases of missing system components – e.g.
the lack of skilled workforce at the company level – misspecified system
connections – e.g. weak science and technology links – and misplaced system
boundaries – e.g. redundancy of regional and national innovative efforts
(Metcalfe, 1995). This is also and above all true at the regional level, at which
these system failures in innovation are exacerbated in case of predominance of
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and when these latter are characterized
by traditional specialization patterns, informal cooperation relationships,
and inward-looking (i.e. mainly local) strategy of interactions with scientific
organisations (e.g. Uyarra, 2010).
Following the system perspective, the target of regional innovation policies
is not simply that of increasing the amount of resources local firms invest in
innovation, and/or their innovative outputs. R&D grants and tax incentives
are instead also conceived in order to enhance innovation opportunities,
capabilities and interactions (Metcalfe, 1995, p.56): in brief, “innovative
behaviours”. Accordingly, the evaluation of regional innovation policies needs
to consider an important dimension, which has been called “behavioural
additionality” (OECD, 2006).
In spite of its relevance, in the literature this kind of evaluation still
hesitates to take off. In particular, given the difficulties to deal with some
challenging issues. On the one hand, when innovative behaviours are con-
sidered, the policy outcome becomes hard to identify, as these behaviours
are not one-shot like, but rather evolve over time once established (as has
been shown, for example, with respect to R&D cooperation (Lhuillery and
Pfister, 2009)). On the other hand, what innovation policy actually “adds””
to the innovative behaviours, which the regional firms would have however
established searching for their competitive advantages, is hard to disentangle.
Non-standard econometric techniques are required, which have been so far
mainly applied to assess the policy boost to the firms’ innovative inputs
(e.g. R&D expenditure) and outputs (e.g. patents) (Buisseret et al., 1995;
Davenport et al., 1998).
As a contribute to fill in this gap, in this paper we investigate the extent
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to which a regional subsidy to firms’ R&D expenditures is able to add a
number of innovative behaviours, within and outside the company and the
regional boundaries. The underlying rationale is that, by qualifying for and
receiving a financial contribution to their internal R&D efforts, the targeted
firms are expected, not only to increase their innovative inputs and outputs,
but also to change the way they engage in the innovation process at the
regional level. In particular, the subsidy could be expected to alleviate the
costs that firms have to undertake in order to increase their internal human
capital and organisational competences – through more or less dedicated
training programs – as well as to contribute to those costs which they face
to acquire external knowledge, through regional and extra-regional business
cooperation agreements.
The policy evaluation is carried out with respect to the Emilia-Romagna
region, in Italy.1 By making use of an original, firm-level dataset, containing
information on both pre-policy characteristics and post-policy behaviours
and performances, a set of propensity score matching techniques is used. The
reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the
behavioural implication of innovation policy at the regional level. Section 3
presents the empirical application and discusses its main results. Section 5
concludes.
2 The behavioural impact of regional innovation
policy
The policy role in affecting firms’ innovative behaviours is particularly impor-
tant at the regional level. This emerges clearly, for example, from regional
scoreboard analysis (such as the European Regional Scoreboard), in which
regions are often found to lag behind the leading ones, not only in their
innovative output (e.g. the number of regional product and/or process in-
novators) and in their innovative inputs/enablers (e.g. the level of regional
tertiary education), but also and above all in the innovative activities of
their firms, such as in the cooperation they entertain with other business
and research organisations (Hollanders et al., 2009).
In regional studies, this issue has been mainly addressed by document-
ing the insufficient capacity of local small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) to conduct in-house R&D, and by recommending public intervention
1In order to maintain the focus, the analysis of the input and the output additionality
of the policy will be not addressed. To be sure, as the investigated policy scheme has
been devised with the “direct” scope to increase the regional firms’ cooperation with
research organisations (e.g. universities and research institutes), the additionality of this
last behaviour has also been left out in order to have a homogeneous focus on what we
could call the “indirect” behavioural effects of the policy. The effects of the same policy
in terms of cooperation with research organisations are investigated in Marzucchi et al.
(2012)
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to remedy this input-gap and thus supporting regional convergence (e.g.
Rodriguez-Pose, 2001; Piergiovanni et al., 1997; Acs and Audretsch, 1990).
Relatively less and recent attention has instead received the gap that regions
might have in innovation because of their firms’ constraints in acquiring and
eventually upgrading those competencies which are necessary to turn their
innovative inputs into outputs (Asheim et al., 2007). In this last respect, the
policy recommendation becomes that of making of the region a “learning
region” (Rutten and Boekema, 2007). On the one hand, innovation policies
are expected to make regional firms more internally ‘receptive’, and help
them develop those competencies which are necessary to master internally
the technology which is relevant to their market needs and to integrate it
within their broader corporate strategies (Morgan, 1997). On the other
hand, regional firms should be also supported in becoming more externally
‘receptive’, and develop those capabilities through which they can absorb
the external knowledge they miss and integrate it with the internal one (e.g.
Uyarra, 2010).
Following this last perspective, a number of different regional policy
schemes have been devised to foster innovative behaviours of regional firms
(see, for example, the seminal evidence provided by Morgan (1997)). First of
all, in terms of “internal receptivity” education and training at the company
level have become a key leverage of public policy for inducing innovation
and regional development, especially within the EU (Markusen, 2008). The
rationale for these policies is quite established and has found new recent
micro-foundation and empirical support (e.g. Ballot and Taymaz, 2001;
Bronzini and Piselli, 2009). In brief, investing in human capital, affects
regional growth and economic development both through “direct channels” –
i.e. by making knowledge grow and stimulating both the introduction and
the adoption of technological and organisational changes – and “indirect
channels – e.g. by facilitating new start-ups and higher firm survival rates
(Mathur, 1999)
In terms of “external receptivity”, innovation policy schemes with a
focus on innovation cooperation are diffusing at the regional level too (e.g.
Hassink, 2002, 2005). Also in this case the supporting arguments are diverse.
As far as the interaction with business partners is concerned, the case has
been made for cooperation policy to helps firms overcome those contractual
(e.g. partners rivalry) and competence-based (e.g. cognitive mis-matches)
problems that market relationships in the field of technology pose to them,
even when they are embedded in the same local, institutional set-up (Fischer
and Varga, 2002). As for the enterprise-research cooperation, the specific
policy role is that of helping firms solving those problems (in particular, of
uncertainty and asymmetric information) which hamper the development of
the knowledge fabric of the region (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999).
In addition to these specific policy interventions, innovative behaviours by
regional firms can also be induced by a more general kind of public funding
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to their own R&D investments. This is the basic idea which underlies the
so-called “behavioural additionality” of an innovation policy, according to
which the policy could lead to a “change in a company’s way of undertaking
R&D” (Buisseret et al., 1995, p. 590, additional emphasis).2 More in
general, as a result of the R&D-projects they are financed for, subsidized
firms are involved in a process of organisational learning which spurs them
to adopt a number of behavioural changes (Clarysse et al., 2009; Antonioli
and Marzucchi, 2012).
The changes that a R&D subsidy can bring to the pre-policy behaviours
of the firms have been found to be of different kind, and have received
different classifications.3 As we said above, out of all these, two behaviours
are particularly important to evaluate in a context of regional development.
The first one refers to the possibility that, by carrying out publicly funded
R&D activities, regional firms are allowed and/or required to undertake
investments in order to upgrade or acquire new competencies, capabilities
and organisational routines for the sake of innovation (e.g. Magro et al., 2010;
Marino and Parrotta, 2010). In so doing, the R&D policy could help regional
firms overcome the costs of investing and exploiting the intangible assets
represented by their workforce and by their organisational capital (Florida
et al., 2008). Accordingly, the evaluation of this first case of behavioural
additionality becomes important for the policy makers to assess their capacity
to close the gap their regions often have in the construction of their internal
knowledge base (Asheim and Coenen, 2005).
The second behavioural effect which deserves attention at the regional
level concerns the additional innovation cooperation that the R&D sub-
sidy could stimulate with the business partners of the treated firms, both
within and outside the regional boundaries (e.g. Hall and Maffioli, 2008;
Afcha Cha´vez, 2011). On the one hand, the policy could help local firms
to face the costs of undertaking virtuous innovation cooperation within the
region (e.g. Fier et al., 2006; Busom and Ferna´ndez-Ribas, 2008). Indeed,
knowledge flows in the business relationships at the regional level are often
unilateral consultancy ones, with little interactive nature, so that they hardly
serve for more than incremental innovations. The same occurs also because
the degree of interaction with local knowledge organisations (e.g. universities)
is often relatively weak and occasional (Asheim and Isaksen, 2002). On the
other hand, the benefit of a R&D subsidy could stimulate regional firms
2This is an extension of the more standard ideas of “input” and “output” additionality
of a policy. In brief, the former refers to the additional resources targeted firms can be
induced to invest in innovation with respect to non-targeted ones. The latter, to the
additional outcomes the former could be led to have with respect to the former (e.g.
Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006)
3Falk (2007), for example, has distinguished, among the others, the ideas of scope addi-
tionality, cognitive capacity additionality, acceleration additionality, challenge additionality,
network additionality, follow-up additionality, and management additionality.
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to embrace extra-regional business cooperation. Indeed, that could help
local firms to support the “liability of foreignness” they have to discount
in cooperating (and competing) across the national boundaries (Zaheer,
1995), and the socio-cultural and techno-economic gap which often separate
business partners of different regions, even in the same national environment
(e.g. Evangelista et al., 2002). Given the role that innovation cooperation
has in inserting local firms into global value chains (e.g. Humphrey and
Schmitz, 2002), evaluating this last bit of behavioural additionality appears
particularly important for devising policies which are able to unlock regional
economies from path dependency, and turn RIS into Open RIS (Belussi et al.,
2010).
3 The behavioural additionality of the PRRIITT:
Emilia-Romagna (Italy)
As an empirical application of the arguments we have developed in the
previous section, in the following we evaluate the behavioural additionality of
an innovation-policy scheme, called PRRIITT (Programma Regionale per la
Ricerca Industriale, l’Innovazione e il Trasferimento Tecnologico (Regional
Program for Industrial Research, Innovation and Technology Transfer)),
which constitutes the core of the policy-space of one of the most innovative
European region: Emilia-Romagna (ER), in Italy.
The ER region has quite idiosyncratic techno-economic features4, which
have made of it a model of local development (known as the “Emilian model”
(Brusco, 1982)) that other European and non-European countries have been
targeting as a benchmark (e.g. Molina-Morales, 2001; Humphrey, 1995).
Furthermore, within an only moderately innovative country, ER is along
with Lombardy the only region which displays the features of a medium-high
innovative region, at the EU27 level.5
Innovation policy has always been a key-element of the innovation system
of this region (Bianchi and Giordani, 1993), which shows some conflicting
characteristics. In spite of their structural features, ER companies perform
relatively well in Europe in terms of innovative activities. On the other hand,
they suffer from the absence of relatively strong innovative enablers (e.g.
population with tertiary education, participation in life-long learning, public
R&D expenditures and broadband access) (Hollanders et al., 2009). ER
firms are also characterised by wide networking, both within and outside the
4In brief: a high density of SMEs, with a pervasive co-location in specialised local
production systems, with diffuse social capital (i.e. industrial districts); a deep rooted
unionism, especially strong in the most industrialised provinces (e.g. Reggio Emilia); an
articulated institutional set-up of business and research organisations.
5This is what emerges from the Regional Innovation Scoreboard (http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/page/regional-innovation-scoreboard), both in 2004 and in 2006.
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region, especially in knowledge-intensive sectors (e.g. Belussi et al., 2010).
However, the linkages they have, both in the business realm and in the
science-industry link, are quite loosely structured and make of the relative
RIS an “informal learning system” when compared with other Italian ones
(Evangelista et al., 2002).
Launched for the first time in 2003, the PRRIITT is a pivotal instrument
of innovation policy in the region. Indeed, it has been conceived in order to
exploit the strengths given by the regional firms dynamism and to mitigate
the weaknesses of the institutional set-up in which they are embedded.6
Within it, particularly important is the Measure 3.1.A, devised in order
to sustain industrial research and pre-competitive development through more
dedicated objectives than a general R&D subsidy. In addition to the direct
support to R&D activities, the subsidy was conceived to spur, among the
others, the reinforcement of the collaboration among the components of the
RIS.
In the first two calls of this measure (in February and September 2004),
on which the current application focuses, regional funds were allocated on
the basis of the assessment of firms’ innovation projects, carried out by an
independent committee of experts. The committee evaluated each project
along several dimensions (each of those having a different potential score):
technical-scientific aspects (45 points); economic-financial aspects (20 points);
managerial aspects (20 points); regional impact (15 points). The threshold
to get funded was then fixed to 75. The eligible firms were then subsidised
by grants covering up to 50% of the total cost of the industrial research
activities and up to 25% (35% for SMEs) of the total cost of the precompetitive
development activities. The overall number of projects subsidised through
the two calls was 529, for a total of 557 recipient firms. The total cost
of the projects proposed by the beneficiaries was about 236 million Euros
and the public funding about 96 million, covering around the 40% of the
total projects’ cost, with an average regional contribution of 175,000 Euros
per-project.
3.1 The dataset
The dataset of the present empirical application has been obtained starting
from a recent ad-hoc survey of the PRRIITT itself, carried out by a research-
group of the University of Ferrara (Italy) (Antonioli et al., 2011). The
survey, which has been accomplished as part of the PRRIITT evaluation,
includes detailed information on structural and organisational characteristics
of a random sample of PRRIITT recipient firms, and on their innovation
strategies. The sample comprehends 555 manufacturing firms, with at least
20 employees, located in the Emilia-Romagna region. It is stratified by size,
6For an extended illustration of the history of this instrument, see Marzocchi (2009).
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province (geographic location at NUTS 3 level) and sector. The information
collected mainly refers to the period 2006-2008.
This first data source has been integrated with balance-sheets data
extracted from the AIDA-BureauVanDijk database, in order to have relevant
information (e.g. intramural R&D and advertising) for the pre-policy period
(year 2003).
The merge of the two datasets results in a working sample of 408 firms:
99 subsidised, and 309 non-subsidised with the PRRIITT Measure 3.1 A.
Table 3A shows that the sample of the treated firms (99 firms) has
a distribution by size (SMEs and large firms) and sector (Pavitt/OECD
taxonomy) similar to that of all the manufacturing firms (with more than 20
employees) that received the regional R&D subsidy. All in all, it can been
deemed to be representative and thus reliable in the econometric test we are
going to carry out.
3.2 Innovative behaviours and controls
The available dataset enables us to employ a number of variables, which
account for the impact of the PRRIITT on both the internal and external
receptivity of the funded firms. As far as the former is concerned, three
variables are obtained about the firms’ behaviour in acquiring and upgrading
their skills and organisational competences: (i) a dummy indicating whether
the workers’ competencies have been improved or upgraded (COMPUP );
(ii) a dummy capturing whether undifferentiated training programs have
been implemented (TRAIN); (iii) a dummy indicating whether the firm has
implemented training programmes to improve technical/specialised compe-
tencies (TECHTRAIN). While the latter two refer to an explicit use of
the R&D subsidy in pursuing an investment in human capital, the former
considers the possibility that the policy improves the firm’s competencies
also through other non deliberated actions, such as learning-by-doing and
learning-by-interacting.
As far as the external-receptivity effect of the policy is concerned, the
dataset enables us to distinguish, still through a set of dummies, whether the
funded firms engaged in innovation cooperation with different kinds of busi-
ness partners – namely suppliers (COOPSUP ), customers (COOPCUS),
competitors (COOPCOM), and firms of the same group (COOPG) – both
within (subscript, REG) and outside (subscript, EXTRA) the region. Given
the importance that the identity of the partners has been found to have in
determining the success (or failures) of R&D cooperation (e.g. Mora-Valentin
et al., 2004; Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009), their distinction in evaluating the
effect of the policy appears more than opportune. As much important is
also to retain the distinction between those interactions through which local
firms possibly try to exploit and/or update the regional knowledge base, and
those through which they might try to overcome the local path-dependence
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from it (ter Wal and Boschma, 2007).
Table 4A presents the main descriptive statistics of the outcome variables.
As we will see, to solve an otherwise insurmountable selection bias in the
econometric estimation of the policy effect, we will compare the innovative
behaviours of funded firms with those of non subsidised companies that have
the same (or significantly similar) “propensity” of being supported by the
policy. In order to do so, a number of proper controls need to be identified
in the dataset, accounting for those features of the firms in the sample which
might have affected the participation in the R&D subsidy scheme.
In order to serve for our econometric strategy, all these variables, except
for the time-invariant ones, are considered at a time (2003), which is be-
forehand the policy (administrated in 2004), thus attenuating endogeneity
problems in the estimates. What is more, many of these covariates (i.e. those
created upon balance sheets data) are of a continuous nature, thus enhancing
the quality of the estimates.
First of all, the innovative profile of the firms is proxied by their expen-
diture (per capita) in intramural R&D and advertising, RDADV2003.
7 The
underlying rationale is that the innovation story of the firm is expected to
affect its decision to apply for public subsidies, and to make further steps
along the innovation path.
Second, the financial condition of the firm is proxied by its cash-flow per
capita (CASHFLOW2003) and its short-term debt index (FINCONST2003).
While the former accounts for the firms’ availability of financial resources
to invest in innovation – without recurring to external sources – the latter
should signal the presence of eventual financial constraints.8
Furthermore, two sets of dummies are introduced in order to control
for the technological nature (a´ la Pavitt) of the firms’ sector (PAV ITT1-
PAV ITT5) and for their size in terms of employment (lnEMP2003). Size and
sector are indeed considered to be relevant determinants of firms’ innovation
activities, as a large amount of literature has shown (e.g. Malerba, 2002;
Cohen, 2010), and thus likely to influence the probability to participate in a
R&D policy scheme. Finally, to account for the intra-RIS heterogeneity of
the innovation processes (e.g. Todtling and Trippl, 2005) and the consequent
different ability/willingness to access to the public funding, we include a set
of dummies capturing firms’ location in terms of NUTS-3 level province.9
Tables 5A presents the main descriptive statistics of the covariates we
7Unfortunately, disaggregated data for the two kinds of expenditure were not available.
On the other hand, recent studies are emerging on their complementarity nature in the
current open-innovation and demand-led paradigm (e.g. Perks et al., 2009).
8The short-term debt is here considered to be probably more relevant than the long-term
one, given the contingent nature of the decision to plan a R&D project and thus apply for
a subsidy.
9One of the dummies (GEO1) captures firms based outside the regional borders, but
having at least a production unit in the region.
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have built up.
3.3 The Propensity Score Matching
As has been widely shown by the econometric literature on the impact of a
R&D policy support (e.g Fier et al., 2006; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Aerts
and Schmidt, 2008; Busom and Ferna´ndez-Ribas, 2008), the choice of the
econometric strategy for its evaluation is determined by the fact that the
policy is in general non-exogeneous.10 Given the problems this entails in
using a OLS model, a viable alternative is that of getting an estimate of
the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT ) for the policy, by making use
of a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983).
Denoting the policy outcome in the presence and absence of the policy-
treatment with Y1 and Y0, respectively, and with D the treatment status
(D = 1: treated; D = 0: untreated), the ATT can be defined as:
ATT = E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1) = E(Y1|D = 1)− E(Y0|D = 1) (1)
In Eq.1, E(Y1|D = 1) can be estimated with a simple mean of the
outcome in the group of funded firms, but E(Y0|D = 1) is by definition
non-observable. In order to overcome this problem, E(Y0|D = 1) needs to be
substituted by referring to a suitable “counter-factual” of non-treated firms.
More precisely, in order to control for the selection bias on observables, the
difference in the outcome of the two groups need to be exclusively due to the
policy intervention. One way to get this is by choosing the non-treated firms
in such a way that they match the treated ones in terms of their propensity
score, Pr(D = 1|X) (or P (X)). In other words, non-treated firms are so to
have the same probability of being funded than the treated ones, given the
set of pre-treatment characteristics, X, which are supposed to affect both
the treatment and the outcome. In so doing, the PSM estimate of ATT is
given by:
ATTPSM = EP (X)|D=1 {E [Y1|D = 1, P (X)]− E[Y0|D = 0, P (X)]} (2)
where P (X) is estimated with a standard probit model.
In estimating Eq(2), different matching procedures will be used,11 which
differ in the way non-treated firms are selected and weighted, and in their
capacity to trade bias reduction with efficiency in the estimates (Caliendo
10One just need to think about its very common “picking the winner” strategy (Cerulli,
2010).
11In particular, the 5 nearest-neighbours, the caliper and the kernel, for which see Becker
and Ichino (2002); Cameron and Trivedi (2009); Smith and Todd (2005); Caliendo and
Kopeinig (2008).
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and Kopeinig, 2008; Smith and Todd, 2005). A comparison of the results
obtained with different algorithms provides information on the stability and,
indirectly, on the reliability of the evidence. For all the implemented matching
procedures, the so-called common support condition (P (D = 1)|X < 1) is
imposed.12 Furthermore, the quality of the matching is checked by controlling
that beneficiaries and controls are correctly aligned with respect to the vector
of covariates X.13
4 Results
As an introduction to our PSM analysis, let us consider the reliability
of the policy propensity-predictors we have identified (Table 1). As ex-
pected, the probability of receiving the investigated subsidy increases sig-
nificantly with the intensity of R&D (and advertising) expenditures of the
firms (RDADV2003). Apparently, a previous experience of innovative invest-
ments, and the effect that it has on their absorptive capacity (Franco et al.,
2011), provides the firms of the region with an advantage also in terms of
funding. On the one hand, firms with a significant history of engagement in
R&D are more willing and able to apply (successfully) for the subsidy. On
the other hand, previous experiences in formal innovation activities seem
to increase firms’ capacity to identify and exploit innovation opportunities
lying outside their boundaries (i.e. in this case the presence of a R&D
subsidy). A significant positive effect on the probability of getting the policy
is also played by the financial conditions of the firms: indeed, the sign on
their financial constraints, FINCONST2003, is negative. In other words,
the firms’ financial soundness could be deemed by the policy makers as a
collateral for an efficient use of the subsidy. Another aspect that affects the
probability of receiving the funding is the sector firms’ belong to. Finally,
also the sector in which the firms operate is an important determinant for the
participation in the subsidy scheme. As expected, firms operating in more
dynamic and technology-intensive sectors are more able/willing to participate
in the subsidy scheme. In addition to scale-intensive firms (PAV ITT4),
science-based companies (PAV ITT3) and firms operating in the propulsive
districtual-core of the region characterised by specialised-suppliers sectors
(PAV ITT5) outperform other industries, in terms of capacity to get funded.
All in all, the regional policy in this RIS seems to follow a “picking the
winner” strategy (Cerulli, 2010). A result which makes the use of a PSM
12This guarantees the presence of suitable counterfactual firms for each treated (Smith
and Todd, 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008),
we also impose the common support condition with a “minima and maxima” comparison.
In addition, a 1% “trim” is applied to the 5 nearest-neighbours matching.
13Drawing on Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), we employ a set of tests (Pseudo-R2 test,
LR test on joint significance and a regression based t-Test on differences in the covariates
means). These largely support the quality of the matching.
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Covariates Coeff. S.E.
lnEMP2003 0.119 0.083
GEO1 3.420*** 1.146
GEO2 1.755* 1.053
GEO3 0.789 1.155
GEO5 1.839* 1.057
GEO6 2.639** 1.096
GEO7 1.531 1.077
GEO8 2.184** 1.083
GEO9 1.849* 1.064
GEO10 1.187 1.122
PAVITT1 0.148 0.29
PAVITT3 1.361*** 0.326
PAVITT4 0.575** 0.279
PAVITT5 0.726*** 0.255
FINCONST2003 -0.881* 0.525
CASHFLOW2003 -0.005 0.005
RDADV2003 0.162*** 0.043
cons -2.671** 1.219
N = 408
Pseudo R2 = 0.217
Prob≥ χ2 0.000
***, **, *: 1%, 5%, 10% significance
VIF test excludes multicollinearity
(all VIF values lower than 10)
Table 1: Probit estimation of the propensity score
methodology actually necessary.
Coming to the behavioural additionality of the investigated scheme, a
first interesting result refers to the effects that it exerts within the bound-
aries of the firm, in terms of acquisition and/or upgrading of the workers’
competencies (Table 2). Indeed, funded firms are more likely (from +16.6%
to +20.0%) to report an upgrading in their competencies, when compared to
similar non subsidised companies. Hence, carrying out funded R&D activities
generates a relevant learning process; a result that is consistent with the
finding of Autio et al. (2008). On the other hand, this learning process does
not seem to pass through complementary training schemes. In fact, taking
into account both general training programmes and programmes targeted to
technical competencies, the effect of the policy is found to be generally not
significant. A possible interpretation for that, which of course would deserve
further investigation, is that the R&D subsidy enables the targeted firms to
make their organisational processes (possibly within and outside the R&D
department) more efficient in terms of learning-by-doing for their employees.
Unlike the innovative behaviours within the corporate boundaries, those
which are carried out across them through innovation cooperation with other
business players do not generally appear to be significantly affected by the
investigated policy scheme (Table 2). First of all, interactions with regional
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clients, suppliers and firms in the same group are generally not significantly
influenced by it. Second, the policy does not appear to induce additional
interactions with business partners across the region.
Given the problems that the region has been found to suffer in terms
of ‘innovative enablers’ (Hollanders et al., 2009), these last results could be
thought to be a sign of inefficiency of the investigated policy. However, in
their interpretation one can not exclude that the firms of this RIS could
be less affected by interactive problems than what the literature generally
suggests, and thus make an alternative use of the scheme. In particular,
the informal character these relationships have been found to have in ER
(Evangelista et al., 2002), within the notable social-milieu of the region
(Brusco, 1982), can help attenuating the rivalry problems and the cognitive
mis-match which often hamper their innovative outcomes (e.g. Lhuillery and
Pfister, 2009).
The R&D subsidy seems able to add innovation cooperation in some
special circumstances (Table 2). This is the case, for example, of its impact on
extra-regional cooperation, which appears significant when the interactions
occur with companies belonging to the same group of the treated ones (from
+9.6% to +10.3%). As a tentative explanation for this result, a certain
organisational proximity – such as the one guaranteed by information filters
and communication channels shared within the group – appears necessary
for the policy to spur regional firms to interact across the border, that is in
absence of geographical proximity.
In the case of other interactions, however, the R&D subsidy seems to
even crowd out innovation cooperation within the region. This is the case of
the interaction with the firm’s competitors, which the subsidy significantly
reduces (from -7.4% to -10.9%). With respect to this result, two tentative and
related explanations could be advanced. On the one hand, one might think
about the possible effect of the subsidy on the trade-off between knowledge
protection and sharing (e.g. Olander et al., 2009). More specifically, it could
be argued that when, due to the subsidy, firms invest in innovation activities
they also reduce the risk of knowledge leakages that could benefit their
competitors. In so doing, they adopt a strategy of knowledge protection which
results in a decreased propensity to cooperate. This seems to be consistent
with the fact that also SMEs (the main beneficiaries of the investigated policy,
see Table 3) and not only large firms generally find secrecy of greater value
than a patenting strategy in securing the appropriability of the innovative
results (Arundel, 2001). On the other hand, it can not be excluded that
the engagement in the publicly funded R&D activities has triggered the
“Non-Invented-Here” syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982), which in this case is
sharpened by the similarity of the potential partners (Wastyn and Hussinger,
2011).
All in all, (the investigated) innovation policy in the ER region seems
to show more of what could be termed ‘cognitive capacity additionality’,
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rather than ‘network additionality’ (Falk, 2007). More precisely, the latter
appears to be a conditional one, for whose working the nature of the business
partners need to be carefully evaluated. In this respect, while the policy
appears to help firms in strengthening their innovative activities by enabling
them internal learning effect, it seems to require a further tailoring effort to
allow firms to benefit from innovation cooperation.
5 Conclusions
Once looked at from a system perspective, as both academic scholars and
policy makers suggest, innovation turns out to be a process in which innovative
behaviours, in particularly at the company level, are as much important
as the innovative inputs firms invest in and the innovative outputs they
obtain. Following this perspective, the array of failures innovation policy is
asked to address extends over incentive problems and appropriability issues.
Indeed, firms might also behave in such a way to suffer from institutional and
cognitive failures, innovation policy should try to solve by devising new policy
instruments and/or approaches. What is more, the need emerges to evaluate
the extent to which these policies actually “add” innovative behaviours to
those which firms would have however undertaken, or not undertaken at all.
In brief, the evaluation of what is called “behavioural additionality” of the
policy becomes crucial.
This is even the more so in regional contexts, where the benefits of agglom-
eration economies are counterbalanced by the disadvantages of several kind
of diseconomies. In particular, because of the obstacles that their structural
features (mainly, small-medium company size, mid-low tech specialization,
informal relationships) pose to those internal organisational processes and
external innovation cooperation, which are crucial for innovative learning to
occur.
The present paper has investigated the extent to which a public R&D
subsidy administrated to regional firms can induce additional behaviours in
terms of competences acquisition/upgrading and innovation cooperation.
The Italian region of Emilia-Romagna (ER) has been investigated for that,
by using a unique dataset, containing info on both pre-policy characteristics
and post-policy behaviours for a representative sample of treated firms.
At the outset, the empirical application has confirmed that innovation
policy can actually follow a “picking the winner” strategy, especially in
a region like ER with an outstanding innovation record at the European
level. In particular, intensive R&D activities, sound financial conditions
and engagement in dynamic and technology-intensive sectors appear to be
considered by the policy makers as leverages for make success-breeds-success
in innovation.
Looking at innovative behaviours internal to the firms, it seems that a
15
R&D subsidy could help firms in getting an additional advantage in terms of
skills and competencies, although this is not one for which additional invest-
ments are carried out. This additionality actually looks a true behavioural,
rather than an input additionality. The policy implication of this first bit of
evaluation is therefore quite straightforward. The financial support to R&D
can actually make firms more active learning organisations, allowing them
to be more efficient in terms of competencies acquisition and/or upgrading.
On the other hand, formal training programs are apparently ‘incremented’
by policy of a different nature. Indeed, we may argue that because of the
dynamic correlation in the course of time between training and innovation
activities (e.g. Acemoglu, 1997; Bauernschuster et al., 2008)), the policy
makers should complement the policy implemented to sustain innovation
with instruments that directly aim to spur the diffusion and adoption of
training programs.
As far as external innovative behaviours are concerned, the investigated
policy scheme seem to have very limited impact in stimulating innovation
cooperation by the firms in the business realm. The only additional impact
here is represented by the capacity that the administration of the policy has
to induce local firms to interact across the boundaries in the business realm.
This additionality is however conditional, as it works providing the loss of
geographical proximity is counter-balanced by the presence of organisational
proximity, which is guaranteed by the firms belonging to the same business
group. To be sure, another significant impact the policy has is in crowding-
out the cooperation with the rivals. With this respect, the policy might have
affected the trade-off between knowledge protection and sharing: in carrying
out publicly funded R&D activities firms are induced to avoid the risk of
knowledge leakages that might benefit their competitors.
All in all, the most direct policy implication might seem that the ER
region has been unable, although with an horizontal policy such as an R&D
subsidy, to stimulate those interactive behaviours it has been found to be in
need as a regional system. However, the possibility that the typical informal,
business relationships of the RIS make rivalry and knowledge mis-match
problems in cooperation less severe, and then make the recipient firms move
the subsidy towards other non-relational kind of behaviours, cannot be
dismissed either.
Of course, the results here presented might be sensible to the characteris-
tics of the context and of the policy considered in the paper, as, in particular,
the fact that SMEs were the main beneficiaries of the intervention, and the
low average public support. However, in spite of its idiosyncratic techno-
economic characteristics (Brusco, 1982; Hollanders et al., 2009), ER has been
found to be a good approximation of the theoretical RIS conceptualisation
(e.g. Evangelista et al., 2002) and a benchmark of an industrial-district based
of model for other countries (e.g. Molina-Morales, 2001; Humphrey, 1995).
For this reason, the results of the present study can have some general value
16
in regional and innovation policy studies.
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Overall Mean Mean
mean subs. non subs. Min. Max.
408 obs 99 obs 309 obs
Acquisition and
upgrading of
competencies
COMPUP 0.740 0.869 0.699 0 1
TRAIN 0.819 0.879 0.799 0 1
TECHTRAIN 0.718 0.818 0.686 0 1
Innovation cooperation
with business
partners
Intra-RIS
COOPCUSREG 0.172 0.162 0.175 0 1
COOPSUPREG 0.184 0.152 0.194 0 1
COOPCOMREG 0.074 0.04 0.084 0 1
COOPGPREG 0.100 0.131 0.091 0 1
Extra-RIS
COOPCUSEXTRA 0.275 0.263 0.278 0 1
COOPSUPEXTRA 0.331 0.364 0.32 0 1
COOPCOMEXTRA 0.076 0.121 0.061 0 1
COOPGPEXTRA 0.113 0.172 0.094 0 1
Table 4: Outcome variables
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